

APPENDIX "A"

Lt. Colonel Henry C. Settle, Inf., Chief of Administration, G-2 ETO, from May 1942 until October 1943, provided the following "Account of Early G-2 Branch Organization", during an interview on 27 October 1944.

On 9 May 1942, Colonel Settle arrived in the ETOUSA. Others in his party were: Major Henry M. Zeller, Captain William H. Saussy, Captain Booth, and one enlisted man, Sgt. W. P. Suggs.

Colonel Homer Case was engaged in carrying on all the various G-2 activities in this Theater, aided by Major Alex P. Gates. No Intelligence Directive was available. The War Department had never stated exactly what it expected of a G-2 in the ETOUSA. G-2 was therefore left to grow "like Topsy" and learn from experience. Confusion and disorganization resulted. Till D-Day, and even afterwards, opinion was divided on what were specific functions of G-2, ETO.

Work on the first Theater Intelligence Directive was begun by Colonel Case. He collaborated with Brig. General R. A. McClure, of CMA. Colonel Francis F. Tompkins, who joined G-2 in June 1942 to organize IB, also helped draft this initial Directive on Theater Intelligence activities. Major Gates, too, helped Colonel Case and worked meanwhile on organization of Censorship Branch.

Most of the early G-2 officers were C and GSS graduates of the 6th Special Class at Camp Ritchie, Md. They completed a three-months' course begun in March 1942. 15 EM for G-2 accompanied Task Force 9025A, the shipment of officers for Hq ETOUSA, Hq Company, and Hq Detachment. Enlisted personnel who arrived in September 1942 filled vacancies created by the reinforced Corps Hq T/O. They were selected from divisions and units throughout the country. Since they lingered in POE's almost three months before their shipping date, these EM needed brush up exercises upon their arrival in UK. They attended typing, filing, and stenography classes in British schools for several months, before undertaking their duties in G-2.

Toward the close of June 1942, G-2 Section consisted of:

Colonel Homer Case
Lt. Col. C. Hazeltine
Colonel F. F. Tompkins
Major A. P. Gates
Lt. Colonel H. M. Zeller
Major H. C. Settle

G-2, ETO
Executive U
Intelligence Branch
Censorship Branch
Plans (with G-3)
Administration Branch

An Administration Branch had not been provided for in the original reinforced Corps T/O for G-2. This oversight was remedied in the T/O drawn up by Colonel Hazeltine for General McClure's signature. W/O James M. McDonald, who had joined G-2 in September 1942 after transferring from Hq SOS, organized the various administrative departments: Message Center, Records, Photo Interpretation. The latter was made part of AB because it performed administrative tasks for Training Branch, receiving, separating, and dispatching photos under TB direction.

Responsibilities of AB were never clearly defined. Combining administrative and executive functions, this Branch served directly under the ACofS, G-2, keeping all other G-2 Branches informed of developments in the whole Section. Three main T/O changes in AB were: 1. Original "reinforced" Corps Hq T/O; 2. T/O of October 1942, following TORCH; 3. Revised T/O of November 1943.

Early G-2 functions were mainly the following:

1. Censorship
2. Counter-Intelligence preparations
3. Organization for future operations
4. Public Relations

Censorship was one of the earliest G-2 problems. Lack of trained personnel was the basic difficulty. Spot-checking of O and EM mail was done by G-2 at Hq ETOUSA. The WD T/O for a Base Censor's office was soon proved inadequate. A fixed table, it was unable to meet the needs of changing troop strength in UK. Nor was adequate machinery provided for censoring mail of SOS troops that arrived in September 1942. One Base Censor Office operated in N. Ireland, while the UK was neglected. Early in June 1942, Major Gates established Base Censor Offices 1 and 2 in England, to handle the rising tide of soldiers' mail.

Counter-Intelligence was another early G-2 responsibility in this Theater. For a while, Major Gates handled CIB matters, too. In July 1942, Major H. G. Sheen joined the G-2 Section and took over CIB activities. A succession of officers had reached ETOUSA, assigned to CIB--although previously assigned "CIB officers" had not been relieved. One CIC Detachment had also been sent overseas for Hq SOS, instead of Hq ETOUSA, with Captain Ruby Gillett as CO. Before leaving Washington, Major Sheen arranged for the transfer of this Detachment from SOS to Hq ETOUSA.

From the start, Major Sheen sought close cooperation between American and British CIC groups. He was aware that the British had primary responsibility and jurisdiction for defense of the Realm. Agents of American CIC units dealt largely with

violation of security by U. S. troops. Major Sheen worked with British CIC experts in preparing his training program for U. S. agents.

In July 1942, before the Operation TORCH, CIC personnel were most inadequate in this Theater. However, just before TORCH started, a large number of agents was sent over to accompany forces moving from UK to N. Africa. Administrative difficulties constantly hampered these early CIC units. While in the US, they were DEML personnel; in ETOUSA, they were considered merely another body of troops. There was no proper organization or provision for their administration. Unable to wear civilian clothes, they were known by all the troops aboard ship. Commanders were totally ignorant of CIC, its background, functions, and mission in this Theater. Under Major Sheen's guidance, G-2 effected a provisional organization for CIC Detachments that accompanied TORCH. He later headed CIC during the Sicilian campaign of September 1943.

Organization for future operations was first entrusted to Major Zeller and Captain Booth, who represented G-2 in Colonel Ray W. Barker's G-3 Plans Section. Colonel Case himself acted as Hq ETOUSA spokesman on various Allied planning committees: Inter-Service Security Board and Joint Intelligence Committee. In late July, shortly before Colonel Case returned to US, Colonel Tompkins became Acting G-2 and represented Hq ETOUSA on Allied Intelligence committees. While TORCH was planned at Norfolk House, G-2 officers belong to three distinct groups: 1. Forward Group (NATO); 2. Rear Group; 3. Hq ETOUSA Officers. Besides helping to plan TORCH, G-2 contributed to building up General Eisenhower's G-2 NATOUSA staff. One G-2 Major was sent to reinforce the G-2 Section of II Corps Headquarters.

After TORCH, G-2 activities were conducted by the Rear Echelon of Norfolk House, under Major Zeller. When this group closed out, much confusion arose. For several weeks, G-2 at Hq ETOUSA desperately tried to catch up on recent intelligence activities, having devoted most of their past months together in specialized TORCH studies.

On 1 August 1942, Brig. General R. M. McClure was appointed ACoS G-2. One of his first actions was to add a Training Branch with Lt. Colonel Bryan C. Conrad as Chief. General McClure himself arranged Colonel Conrad's transfer from OMA. Colonel Tompkins, whose IB was well under way, received the task of finishing the Theater Intelligence Directive.

General McClure, while G-2 ETO, continued to act as Military Attache. He took over supervision of Norfolk House and acted as G-2 of the Rear Echelon. When General McClure became, in addition, Chief of Staff, Hq ETOUSA, Colonel Sumner Waite,

G-2 Executive Officer, was announced Acting ACofS G-2 for General McClure. This post Colonel Waite retained until February 1943, when he returned to the U.S. A. Another officer who joined G-2 under General McClure was Lt. Colonel Morrow Krum, PRO. Public Relations was part of G-2 at this time because Army Handbooks always included this branch in standard G-2 organization charts.

Under General McClure's supervision, shortly before he joined General Eisenhower's PRO and Censorship Staff in NATOUSA, the first G-2 T/O was prepared. Colonel Chase had done some work on this T/O before he returned to America, aided by Colonel Hazeltine, Executive Officer. In September 1942, General McClure submitted to CG, ETOUSA the consolidated G-2 T/O, which was a revision of the original Corps Hq T/O provided by the War Department.

After TORCH, G-2 officers included:

Brig. General McClure	ACofS, G-2
Colonel Sumner Waite	Executive O
Colonel Tompkins	Intelligence Br
Colonel Gates	Censorship
Colonel Conrad	Training Br
Lt. Colonel M. Krum	Public Relations
Colonel C. R. Abraham	Counter-Intell. Br
Lt. Colonel Settle	Administration Br

With Colonel Abraham, who had come to G-2 from Iceland Headquarters, were Colonel Gates (Censorship) and Major Sheen (CIC). Colonel Abraham in March 1943 headed Information and Censorship Section (PRO and Censorship) under General Andrews. In May 1943, I and C was dissolved, and PRO set up as a separate section (Staff level) headed by Colonel Krum. Censorship activities returned to G-2, ETO. Other G-2 officers who served with General Andrews were Colonel Percy G. Black (G-2, ETO) and Lt. Colonel Jules Dubois (Exec. C, G-2).

On 5 October 1943, Brig. General Edwin L. Sibert relieved Brig. General James C. Crockett as G-2, ETO. (Note: General Crockett was G-2 from May to October 1943). Under General Sibert, Colonel Conrad headed Operations Branch, which performed such miscellaneous functions as:

- Escape and Evasion (E & E)
- PW & X
- Training (with G-3)
- Photo Interpretation
- IPW (Interrogation of Prisoners of War)

Planning, too, was briefly contemplated as an Operations function

but then dropped. Colonel Conrad was in full charge of various Intelligence Field Units and Teams. Under his guidance, Colonel J. R. Elyachar, a skilled linguist, formed the Mobile Intelligence Training Units, which traveled in troop areas and demonstrated latest German equipment, techniques, and practices. Without any T/O, T/E, money, or official authorization, Colonel Elyachar collected materials for Intelligence Schools and demonstration units. Combat officers expressed their satisfaction over the impressive array of enemy equipment Colonel Elyachar had gathered with the help of G-3 personnel. For his efforts, Colonel Elyachar, at the recommendation of Colonel Conrad, was awarded the Legion of Merit.

When these field units became too top-heavy for G-2, they were formed into MIS, ETOUSA. Besides, the teams were operational, while G-2 functions were largely planning on a Staff level. Colonel Settle asked for a Major to head up MIS, to avoid outranking G-2 Branch Chiefs with whom MIS must deal. Early in October 1943, after the official allocation of grades and ratings had been approved, Colonel D'Alary Fechet was announced Chief of MIS, ETOUSA.

G-2 experienced a profound reorganization shortly after FUSAG was established on 16 October 1943. The G-2 problem was to staff G-2 FUSAG and still remain Theater G-2. Colonel Conrad received the task of reorganizing G-2 and setting up the G-2 FUSAG staff. He was aided by Colonel Hamer P. Ford in Training Branch. General Sibert became G-2, FUSAG when another general, who was slated for the position, failed to turn up. Each G-2 ETOUSA branch was augmented so that it could sub-divide itself and continue to function for the Theater. Intelligence Branch was slated to yield all its functions to G-2, FUSAG; but this plan was abandoned after several weeks of uncertainty.

G-2 received the first WACs for duty in this Theater. Lt. Colonel W. S. Holt, of PW & X Detachment, personally selected eight WACs and asked the War Department to assign them to G-2 on A-1 priority, for administering PW personnel. He managed to overcome the WAC regulation forbidding attachment of WACs to any unit in groups less than 50, to assure proper administration and disciplinary organization.

In October 1942, G-2 formally submitted its requirements for WAC personnel. Colonel Settle asked for almost 100 WACs, to replace more than 80% of the EM in G-2 Section. He eventually got 66 WACs, which actually represented a major part of the entire Hq ETOUSA requisition. G-2 got most of the WACs because the section had asked for them earlier than anyone else. However, most of these WACs acted as replacements for a large part of the G-2 EM strength that went over to staff G-2 FUSAG.

Relations between G-2 and other Hq ETOUSA Staff Sections were generally satisfactory. G-2 and G-1 worked harmoniously in assigning intelligence personnel to various organizations in the ETOUSA. G-3 helped form MIT Units, then took over full control of the outfit after a T/O was authorized. G-2 worked hand in hand with G-3 in all Training matters. Cooperation was essential, for in the Spring and Summer of 1942, G-2 had no substantial facilities to carry out its training responsibility. When Colonel Conrad began his Training Branch activities, he relied on G-3 to allocate vacancies in British intelligence schools. Now and again a G-3 officer failed to make proper recommendations to the War Office. CIB arrangements, for instance, were often unsatisfactory. But coordination with G-3 was in many ways fruitful. British schools, too, proved most cooperative; they opened all doors to American personnel.

Colonel Conrad later took full charge of arranging courses for U. S. Intelligence personnel at American School Center. Captain Garvey was active in this project, too. A plan was devised, with the cooperation of CG, 29th Infantry Division, to replace 50% of all intelligence personnel with Camp Ritchie graduates; also, rotation of personnel for American School Center courses.

The following ~~were~~^{were} the chief obstacles which G-2 sought to overcome:

1. Lack of organization at the start.
2. No definite mission revealed by the War Department.
3. No established U. S. Intelligence Agencies in UK.
4. Neglect of intelligence training in peacetime.
5. Absence of trained personnel.
6. Lack of integration with G-2's of separate Armies.