

Type Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service (EEIS Detach
No 9.)

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By GUY & DARKEY, Major, AGO
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A TYPICAL ENEMY EQUIPMENT INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

(Basis Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Detachment Number 9
Signal Section Headquarters 9th U.S. Army A.P.O. 339)

The Enemy Equipment Identification Team was set up at Fort Monmouth, New-Jersey, with a total of five officers and six enlisted men.

The Team arrived on 13 April 1944 at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, to begin the first portion of its special training. This consisted of a specially prepared condensation of the regular Intelligence course, with emphasis on those subjects which pertained to the missions of the Team. Subjects covered included known enemy signal equipment, enemy weapons, the Battle Order of the Enemy Forces; map reading, and a familiarization course of the operational set-up of other intelligence units, such as Prisoner Interrogation and Photo Interpretation Teams. The entire course was given in two weeks. The period of time given was not enough for either the instructors or the team members. The instructors had to rely heavily on "poop" material, which they distributed and the team members found it impossible to absorb the great amount of material presented in so short a time. The Team did learn some important facts, which proved important in the field. The major among these was the necessity for keeping close contact with other intelligence agencies in the field, in order to ascertain that information was received from them. Another course that has proved most useful in the field was the course of Map Reading. The forward elements were constantly required to travel in unfamiliar territory and a knowledge of maps and of Map Reading was necessary.

At the completion of the Camp Ritchie course the Team returned to Eastern Signal Corps training center, Camp Charles Wood, Eatontown, New Jersey and spent two weeks in preparation for overseas movement and in visiting the various Signal Corps laboratories. At the laboratories the unit was briefed in enemy equipment. This briefing included both the equipment already picked up and analysed and the equipment being sought. Emphasis was placed on enemy infra-red and enemy Radar, of which little was known. The entire personnel was also given a brief out-line on the functions of Radar and were shown American Radar units to familiarize themselves with the appearance of the different types of Radar. During the same period of time the Radar personnel of the Team began a special course at Camp Evans, New Jersey, where they studied German Radar and the latest developments in American Radar. The German Radar consisted mainly of a "Wurtzburg" gun laying set, which had been picked up in Africa. The course on American Radar was added in order that the personnel might know what to expect from the enemy and to have a basis for comparison.

The unit was flown to London, England, in July 1944 in small groups.

At first the unit was attached to the first United States Army Group, later assigned to Headquarters European Theater of Operations, United States Army and placed under the technical supervision of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Communications Zone.

Contact was established with the Commanding Officer of Enemy Equipment Intelligence Section Detachment # two, which was operating on the Continent. He oriented the unit with the work Detachment # two was doing and the Standard Operating Procedure for field operations.

Due to the mode of transportation to the United Kingdom, the unit

was directed to turn in all the supplies requisitioned in the United States. This necessitated starting from "scratch" upon arrival in the United Kingdom. Trips were made to all parts of the United Kingdom to gather the equipment authorized in the Table of Equipment. At the time of embarkation for the Continent, most of the equipment had been gathered. Notable exceptions were a thirty-five millimeter camera, a sturdy tripod for the Speed Graphic Camera, two extra lenses for the Speed Graphic and some component parts of the Signal Corps Test Set 1 E-9. The experience of the Enemy Equipment Intelligence Section Detachment in the field had proved the necessity of a laboratory which could be quickly moved from place to place. To meet this requirement an unclosed van was procured by the Technical Liaison Division, Office of the Chief Signal Officer.

At the same time that equipment was being procured, certain elements of the Team received additional technical training. The Radar Officer and enlisted men attended a course at the Military College of Science, Bury, England, on the German "Wurtzburg" and "Freya" Radar units and on known German anti-jamming Radar services. The radio and telephone personnel visited Christ Church, England, and studied enemy equipment available there. A two-day course was taken by the radio personnel in German airborne equipment, and the entire unit attended a course in mines and booby traps, the subject of the course was the detection and neutralisation of mines and booby traps.

The unit embarked for the Continent on 28 August 1944, and established contact with Enemy Equipment Intelligence Section Detachment # 3, and worked with that detachment observing their field and laboratory techniques. Many phases of field work were discussed and much

valuable information was acquired.

Later the unit reported to the Headquarters Ninth U.S. Army, Rennes, France and went into operation immediately. The Ninth U.S. Army had taken over the Brest campaign and had arranged for the surrender of 20,000 Germans at Beaugency and Orleans, France. A forward party was dispatched to cover each of these operations. At the time, the rear echelon was setting up their equipment and making the necessary contacts with the Signal and Intelligence agencies in the Ninth U.S. Army. The forward echelons returned when their mission was completed. The Team operating in Brest discovered and turned over much enemy material to the Signal Corps Units for utilization. Little of importance was discovered at Beaugency and Orleans, France, as the Germans had either abandoned or destroyed all but the bare essentials in equipment before reaching the surrender area.

Certain deficiencies in the Table of Equipment were discovered during the operational period. For one thing, the power unit, PE-75, was found to be inadequate and dependable and was therefore exchanged for a power unit, PE-95. Two additional $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks were needed, since the forward elements operating with Corps needed transportation leaving a two and a half ton truck for transportation for the rear echelon. The test equipment was not accurate enough to make the necessary laboratory tests on the captured equipment, however, the unit was able to utilize certain captured enemy test equipment to supplement the Table of Equipment, including a German tube tester, a resistance capacitance bridge, and radio tools. Other items needed for proper technical analysis were accurately calibrated signal generator voltmeters and a source of variable voltage, to enable the

technical section to put enemy equipment into operation for test purposes. The photographer of the detachment was forced improvise a sturdy tripod from an enemy engineering transit tripod. His work would have been expedited and improved by the use of photo lamps and reflectors, not on the Table of Equipment.

The Ninth U.S. Army was comparatively inactive after the capture of Brest, France, until 16 November 1944; when it commenced its drive into Germany. The Ninth U.S. Army assumed the command of the XIXth Corps on 24 October 1944 and a forward team was dispatched to make contact with the Corps and Division Signal Officers.

A serious difficulty hampering the operation of this Detachment, was the lack of coordination between it and other organizations doing similar work. A committee was formed whose functions were to coordinate the activities of the field parties and to provide means for inter-change of technical electronics intelligence. This committee determined Enemy Equipment Intelligence Section, assisted the Air Technical Intelligence in the location of enemy Radar, and relayed the necessary information to them.

The drive of the Ninth U.S. Army into Germany started on 16 November 1944, was a slow, tedious advance, with the enemy resisting fiercely at all points. The two forward teams maintained daily contact with the XIXth Corps, and lower echelons assigned and attached to these respective Corps. At times, it was necessary for these teams to go down to Battalion and Company levels to pick up equipment. However, due to the slowness of the advance, the enemy had enough time to evacuate or destroy most of the equipment of intelligence value.

With the German counter offensive, which started on 16 December 1944 enemy air activity increased, with a resultant increase of enemy aircraft

shot down in the ninth U.S. Army territory. Arrangements were made with all agencies involved to furnish this Detachment with the locations of crashed aircraft, belonging to the enemy, which were immediately checked for all items of Signal Intelligence value one of the items brought in was a German "Identification Friend or Foe" Unit, SE-25a.

During January 1945, Teams were sent to Aachen, Germany, to comb the city for electronic supplies. This operation was carried on with the cooperation of the Military Government in Aachen. Military Government provided German guides and the necessary credentials. A great amount of supplies was unearthed and turned over to the ninth U.S. Army Signal Supply Depot for utilization. Such thorough searches of cities for supplies could only been carried out during lulls at the front.

Prior to the advent of the Ruhr River crossing on 23 February 1945, the forward teams operating with XIXth Corps and XIIIth Corps, were attached to their respective Corps Headquarters. This arrangement enabled the Teams to keep closer contact with the advancing forces, thereby improving their efficiency.

CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED